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(ii) an opting-out scheme, and (iii) an opting-out-cum-transfer scheme which combines el-
ements of the first two. A topping-up scheme can never do better than private insurance;
opting out and opting-out-cum-transfer schemes can because they provide some insurance
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crowding out. A topping-up policy entails crowding out at both intensive and extensive
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1 Introduction
The interaction between market, state and family in providing protection against lifetime risks
is a topic of immense interest in economics. In earlier times, family was the exclusive provider of
social protection; then came the state and the market. The emergence of these latter institutions
has been both a cause and a contributing factor to the decline of family involvement. This has
given rise to many questions about the role that each of these three institutions can or should
play as the society’s risk insurer. Prescribing an exact mission for each institution is of course
a somewhat impossible task. Instead, economists have mostly concerned themselves with the
issue of crowding out—the withdrawal of the market or the family from providing services when
the state provides them (seemingly for free).1
The risk of old-age dependency, and provision of long-term care (LTC), is a particular lifetime
risk that has garnered a lot of attention in recent years. LTC is different from—albeit often
complementary to—health care, particularly terminal care or hospice care. It concerns the
dependent elderly who need help to carry out their daily activities (and may or may not require
medical care). Providing this type of assistance is labor intensive and often quite costly, specially
in severe cases of dependency that call for institutional care.
Currently, dependency presents the elderly with a significant financial risk of which social
insurance covers only a small part.2 As to the private insurance markets, health insurers typically
reimburse services deemed to be of medical nature; they do not cover LTC costs. At the same
time, private insurance markets dedicated solely to the provision of LTC are thin and very
expensive. As a consequence, individuals often have to rely on their own private savings or on
the informal care their family members provide which continues to represent a significant part
of total LTC provision; see Norton (2000, 2016). This is often insufficient and leaves the elderly
who cannot count on family solidarity without proper care.
Various societal trends point to an accelerating decline in family involvement. Family soli-
darity closely depends on the survival of a spouse and on the geographical proximity of children.
Over the past few decades, we have seen an increasing number of elderly living alone because of
divorce and widowhood. As to children, childless families are not infrequent and the mobility of
children can make nursing assistance somewhat impossible. Increased female labor force partic-
ipation, population aging, and drastic changes in family values are other contributing factors.
Moreover, long-run trends aside, informal care is subject to many random shocks. There are
pure demographic factors such as widowhood, absence, or loss of children; divorce and migration
too can be put in this category. Children’s financial problems, and conflicts within the family,
might also prevent children from helping their parents.
The decline in informal care, whatever the reason, makes the need for formal LTC insurance—
private or social—a very pressing issue in the coming decades. To be sure, there are two sources
of uncertainty giving rise to the problem of formal LTC provision: One is the state of health
1On the LTC programs’ crowding out of family provision or the purchase of private insurance, see, e.g., Cremer
et al. (2012b) and Grabowski et al. (2012).
2In the US, Medicare does not cover LTC; Medicaid, which is offered to families with minimal private sources,
does.
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in old age and the other the availability of informal care from the family. As far as private
insurance markets are concerned, while they could potentially provide coverage against the risk
of dependency per se, the uncertainty associated with the level of informal care appears to be
a mostly uninsurable risk. This particular form of market failure creates a potential role for
public intervention. However, it is unlikely that public administrators have better information
than parents themselves about their prospects of receiving informal care in case of dependency.
That is, the government cannot condition its assistance to the elderly directly on the default
of altruism; only on old-age dependency. Consequently, public intervention would not lead to a
first-best outcome either. Nevertheless an interesting policy question arises. Can, under these
circumstances, the government design second-best policies that might do better than the partial
insurance private insurance markets against dependency provide (in terms of coverage and/or
costs)? This is the question that lies at the heart of our study.
To study the role and design of LTC policies when altruism is uncertain, we consider a
single generation consisting of parents and children. Initially, we concentrate on the welfare
of the parents over their life cycle. Subsequently, in a final section, we investigate how the
results might be affected when social welfare also includes the children’s utility. Parents work,
consume, and save for their retirement when young. In old age, they face a risk of becoming
dependent. The probability of dependency is exogenously given and known. On the other hand,
when making their savings and insurance decisions, parents do not know if their children would
take care of them should they become dependent. Nor do they know the extent of the assistance
if it is forthcoming. We represent this uncertainty by a single parameter called the children’s
“degree of altruism” and assume that it is continuously distributed over some interval.3 Our
conception of altruism is broad. It includes willingness to help as well as the required financial
ability to provide care (which may entail, beyond some level, reducing one’s labor supply).
As our starting point, we show that even if private insurance markets for dependency exist
and are actuarially fair, they leave dependent parents who end up without informal care under-
insured. Then, having established that uncertainty in altruism creates a potential role for public
provision of LTC, we study the design of public LTC policies. Specifically, we consider three
schemes—two of which are often used in connection with provision of private goods by the public
sector. In one, referred to as a topping-up scheme (TU ), the transfer to dependent parents
is conditional on dependency alone. This kind of transfer can be supplemented by informal
and market care. In the second, referred to as an opting-out scheme (OO), LTC benefits are
exclusive and cannot be topped up. The OO scheme can, for instance, provide free or subsidized
institutional care. Third, we consider a more refined OO policy that allows parents to choose
between two options, say, a monetary help for care provided at home and a nursing home care
provided on an opting out basis. This policy, which we call an “opting-out-cum-transfers”
scheme (OC ), combines the offer of an exclusive LTC to whoever wants to opt in with a transfer
to those who opt out. Interestingly, the transfer can be positive or negative (in the form of a
tax). The rationale for, and implications of, all three schemes are studied with and without
actuarially fair private insurance markets for dependency.
3One can also think of this parameter as indicating the inverse of a child’s cost of providing care.
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The question of LTC provision under uncertain altruism has previously been studied by
Cremer et al. (2014, 2017). Our paper is different from theirs in two major respects. First,
they assume that altruism is a binary variable: Children are either altruistic with some known
degree or not altruistic at all. In our setup, the altruism parameter is a continuum. Modeling a
continuous distribution for the degree of altruism is not simply an academic exercise. It brings
to light the various tradeoffs involved within and across different LTC schemes and plays a
fundamental role in policy design. The very distinction between crowding out at the extensive
and intensive margins, that has important and different implications for each of the schemes
we study, is not even meaningful in the binary model. This is particularly true for the opting-
out-cum-transfer policies; the tradeoffs we identify there are completely obscure in the binary
model. Second, within the framework of the binary model, Cremer et al. (2017) compares TU
and OO policies and Cremer et al. (2014) concentrates only on OO.4 Neither paper studies the
opting-out-cum-transfer policies.5
Different LTC schemes may coexist within a given country; although, in practice, most
are of the TU type.6 These include (possibly means-tested) cash transfers like APA (Al-
location Personalise´e d’Autonomie) in France, the “Pflegegeld” in Germany, and “Assegno
d’Accompagnamento” in Italy. They also include in-kind transfers like “meals on wheels” or
formal home care services provided for free, or at subsidized rates, in most European countries.
Scandinavian countries offer a choice between formal care provided at home or at institutions.
Institutionalized elderly may have to pay a rent and may be granted a personal-need allowance
to pay for residual consumption. It is nevertheless the case that, even in Scandinavian coun-
tries where LTC insurance is primarily based on formal care provision, dependent individuals
continue to rely heavily on informal care; see Karlsson et al. (2010).
The closest example of a OO scheme is the formal care that nursing homes provide (even
though in practice relatives provide some additional informal care like visits and assistance during
meals etc.) The pure OO policy considered in this paper is a theoretical limiting case. But real
world policies are clearly not optimal (and keep being reformed). In most countries, public
nursing facilities are of poor quality and chronically under-staffed because of insufficient funding
as well as lack of sufficient supply of caregivers in the labor market. Offering nursing home
care as a last resort, combined with incentives to stay home if dependency is not too severe,
serves as an example of an opting-out-cum-transfer policy (with a positive TU component).
This type of policy, aimed at promoting informal care, is increasingly being put in place. Some
examples include LTC leaves for working children that enables them to combine care with a
professional activity (the Netherlands), cash transfers to the elderly being cared for by family
4This latter paper also allows for the parents to affect the children’s caregiving decisions thus making the
probability that children provide care is endogenous.
5Our paper also contributes to the general literature on in-kind versus cash transfers which has extensively
studied the properties of TU and OO schemes both from a positive and a normative perspective. On the normative
side, for instance, Blomquist and Christiansen (1998) show that both regimes can be optimal (to supplement an
optimal income tax) depending on whether the demand for the publicly provided good increases or decreases with
labor. From a positive perspective, TU regimes may emerge from majority voting rules, as shown by Epple and
Romano (1996). For a review of the literature, see Currie and Gahvari (2008).
6For an overview of different policies and financing models in the EU, see Lipszyc et al. (2012) and European
Commission (2013).
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members (Germany), training and support services for caregivers, and respite care for families
taking care of dependent individuals (Sweden).7
A major concern often raised in the LTC literature, regarding the efficacy of public programs,
is that of the crowding out of informal care; see Cremer et al. (2012). It is important to
distinguish between two types of crowding out: at the “intensive margin” and at the “extensive
margin”. The intensive margin refers to the reduction in the informal care children provide
when social LTC becomes available. Crowding out at the extensive margin occurs when some
children are dissuaded from providing any informal care. We show that TU and OO policies
have different effects on informal care. Whereas OO crowds out informal care only at the
extensive margin, TU entails crowding out both at the intensive and the extensive margins.
Given this property, one might be tempted to think that the OO always dominates the TU
policy. However, as the general theory of the second best has taught us, this type of reasoning
is faulty. In our model, if the share of non-altruistic children in the population is large, the
crowding out at the intensive margin is rather small in the aggregate and that might make TU
the preferable policy.
The most interesting tradeoffs arise under an opting-out-cum-transfer scheme. As with the
pure OO policy, the offer of an exclusive LTC entails crowding out at the extensive margin. On
the other hand, cash transfers to dependent parents who opt out have the opposite effect.8 This
is because such a transfer lowers the children’s cost of providing informal care thus encourag-
ing more children to opt out and assist their parents. Nevertheless cash transfers continue to
entail crowding out at the intensive margin. The opting-out-cum-transfers scheme enables the
children who already assist their parents under a pure OO system to cut their transfers by the
same amount that the government gives to parents (keeping the parents’ consumption levels
unchanged).
That the crowding outs associated with transfer component of an opting-out-cum-transfer
scheme go in opposite directions tells us that there is a likelihood that the transfer should be
negative. Put differently, the optimal policy may require the parents who opt out should be
taxed rather than subsidized (paid in the second period). The upshot is that the dependent
parents who opt out should be given a positive transfer if the extensive margin effect dominates,
and be taxed if the intensive margin effect dominates. Effectively, this enables the government
to treat ex-ante identical parents differently (as far as their tax and transfers are concerned).
Finally, we consider two extensions to our base model and examine the implication of each
for our results. In one, we incorporate actuarially fair insurance markets for dependency in our
model. We find that the laissez-faire allocation in this case is identical to the outcome of the TU
policy under our base model. This tells us that with actuarially fair insurance markets there
is no role for a TU policy. By contrast, an OO policy or an opting-out-cum-transfer policy
preserve their potential welfare-enhancing role. That is, even in the presence of actuarially fair
insurance markets for dependency, the may lead to an outcome preferable to the laissez-faire
equilibrium.
7For a survey of these policies in OECD countries, see Gori et al. (2016).
8Transfers under this scheme differ from cash transfers under TU in that the latter gives them to everyone.
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The second extension concerns the treatment of children’s utility in the social welfare func-
tion. Crowding out, while bad for parents, may be beneficial to children because it can mitigate
the cost that dependency imposes on informal caregivers. To examine this, we extend our base
model and consider a broader social welfare function which includes the utility of children as
well. This calls for a higher level of government assistance under TU as compared to our base
model. On the other hand, the expansion of public LTC is not necessarily warranted for the
other two policies even though the basic tradeoffs outlined for the base model remains the same.
These latter two policies have mixed effects on the children’s utilities. To the extent that they
reduce the cost of providing informal care to the children, as in a TU regime, they will be
beneficial. However, they can also be detrimental in that they might lead the parents to save
less thus shifting a larger share of the burden to informal caregivers.
2 The model
Consider a single generation of parents and children, each treated as a single unit, over two
periods of their lifetime. All parents are identical ex ante and face two types of risk. First is the
risk of becoming dependent when they are old and retired; the second pertains to the informal
care they may or may not receive, if they become dependent, from their grown-up children.
Provision and the extent of informal care depends on how altruistic the children are.
The sequence of events/actions, described as a game, is as follows. Period 0 constitutes
the first stage when the government formulates and announces its tax/transfer policy. Period
1 is the second stage when young working parents decide on their savings. Period 2 is when
the parents have grown old, are retired, and may or may not be dependent. The game will be
over for parents who remain healthy in old age; they simply consume their savings. Dependent
parents, on the other hand, move to the third stage where their children, who have by now
turned into working adults, decide how much informal care, if any, they want to provide their
parents with.9
The two sources of uncertainty come into play in the first stage when parents are to make
their savings decisions. The probability of their becoming dependent when old, pi, is exogenously
given and known. The second source of uncertainty, the degree of altruism of their children when
grown up, is represented by a random variable β ≥ 0 distributed according to the distribution
function F (β) with density f(β).10 Altruism is to be understood broadly; it captures not just
the willingness to help but also the financial ability to provide informal care. The higher is β the
more altruistic a child is. Children with β = 0 have no altruistic feelings toward their parents.
We assume that F (·) is concave; this implies F (β) > βf(β).11
Parents have preferences over consumption when young, c ≥ 0, consumption when old and
healthy, d ≥ 0, and consumption when old and dependent, e ≥ 0 (which is probabilistic and
inclusive of LTC services). Parents associate no disutility to work and supply a fixed amount
9In our setup, parents always find it optimal to accept the informal care that their children are willing to
provide regardless of their participation in any public scheme.
10We rule out β < 0. A negative β implies that children will become happier if their parents are worse off.
11This condition is sufficient (but not always necessary) for most of the second-order condition of the paper to
be satisfied and for some comparative statics results. We shall point out explicitly where and how it is used.
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of labor when young. Their preferences are quasilinear in c; risk aversion is introduced through
the concavity of the state-dependent utilities in the second period. Denote the utility function
for consumption when old and healthy by U (d) and when old and dependent by H (e). The
parents’ life-time expected utility is
EU = c+ (1− pi)U (d) + piE [H (e)] , (1)
where E (·) is the expected value operator. Assume that U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, U(0) = 0, U ′(0) =∞,
and that the same properties hold for H.
Grown-up children too have quasilinear preferences and their altruism toward their par-
ents comes into play only if the parents become dependent. The children’s utility function is
represented by
u =
{
y − a+ βH (e) if the parent is dependent,
y if the parent is non-dependent,
(2)
where y denotes the children’s fixed income and a ≥ 0 denotes any transfers that they might
make to their dependent elderly parents. No transfers are made to the healthy elderly parents
regardless of the size of their savings, s.
2.1 Laissez faire—No private insurance markets
Parents’ uncertainty regarding the degree of altruism of their grown-up children plays a central
role in any potential justification for government intervention. To understand this, it will be
helpful to compare the equilibrium solutions that emerge in the laissez faire with and without
private insurance markets. We begin with the case that there are no private insurance markets.
Proceeding by backward induction, consider the last decision-making stage in our setup.12 This
is when the grown-up children decide on the extent of their help to their parents, if any.
2.1.1 Stage 3: The children’s choice
Children supplement the saving s of their dependent parents by an amount a ≥ 0 from their own
income y. The optimal level of assistance, a∗, is found through the maximization of equation
(2). The first-order condition with respect to a is, assuming an interior solution,
−1 + βH ′ (s+ a) = 0. (3)
Concavity of H (·) ensures that the second-order condition is satisfied. Equation (3) implies
that, with an interior solution, a∗ satisfies13
s+ a∗ =
(
H ′
)−1( 1
β
)
≡ m(β), (4)
where the concavity of H (·) implies that m′(β) > 0.
12There is no first stage in the laissez faire. However, to be consistent with the sections that follow, we refer to
the last and the next-to-last stages as 3 and 2.
13A corner solution at a = y cannot be ruled out. To avoid a tedious and not very insightful multiplication of
cases we assume throughout the paper that the constraint a ≤ y is not binding in equilibrium.
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Setting a = 0 in (3) gives the minimum level of β for which a child provides a positive level
of care to his parent who has saved s. Denoting this level by β0(s), we have
β0 (s) ≡ 1
H ′ (s)
. (5)
We shall refer to a child on the verge of providing informal care to his parents as the “marginal
child”.14 When β < β0, we have a
∗ = 0 and the parents’ consumption is equal to his own
savings. To sum,
e =
{
s if β < β0 (s) ,
s+ a∗ = m(β) if β ≥ β0 (s) .
(6)
Differentiating (6) with respect to β yields
de
dβ
=
{
0 if β < β0 (s) ,
m′(β) = −1
β2H′′(e) > 0 if β ≥ β0 (s) ,
where the sign of m′(β) follows from the concavity of H (·).15 As expected, a dependent parent’s
total consumption increases with the degree of altruism of his child. Figure 1 illustrates the
relationship between old-age consumption e and β.
β
Old-age consumption
β0
s
m(β)
0
Figure 1: Laissez faire with no private insurance markets: consumption of dependent parents as
a function of the children’s degree of altruism.
Finally, observe that parents’ savings crowd out informal care in two ways. The first is
crowding out at the intensive margin. Equation (6) indicates that, as long as children continue
to provide informal care, its amount is crowded out by parents’ savings on a one-to-one basis.
Second, differentiating (5) tells us that,
dβ0
ds
= − H
′′
(H ′)2
> 0.
Hence increasing savings increases β0 and in this way reduces the likelihood of children assisting
their parents in case of dependency (crowding out at the extensive margin).
14The “marginal child” will be a different child depending on the considered economic setting.
15The function m is not differentiable at β = β0. To avoid cumbersome notation we use m
′(β) for the right
derivative at this point.
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2.1.2 Stage 2: The parents’ choice
Recall that, when retire, parents will either be healthy or dependent (with probabilities 1 − pi
and pi). If healthy, their sole means of consumption is their own saving s as they will receive no
transfers from their children. If dependent, they may or may not receive a transfer depending
on the children’s degree of altruism β. Denote the (fixed) labor supply of parents by T and their
wage by w so that their expected lifetime utility is
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piE [H (e)] , (7)
where e is equal to s when β < β0(s) and equal to s + a
∗(β, s) when β ≥ β0(s). From (4),
substitute m (β) for s+ a∗(β, s) into (7) to get
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi
[
H (s)F (β0) +
∫ ∞
β0
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
.
Maximizing EU with respect to s, and assuming an interior solution, the optimal value of
savings, sLF , satisfies16
(1− pi)U ′ (sLF )+ piF (β0(sLF ))H ′ (sLF ) = 1, (8)
where the second-order condition is also satisfied due to concavity of F (β).17
Equation (8) states that the expected benefit of saving must be equal to its cost (which is
equal to one). The first term on the left-hand side shows the benefit of saving to elderly parents
if they remain healthy when old; the second term indicates the benefit of saving to them if they
become dependent but would not receive informal care. Saving is of no benefit to dependent
parents who would receive assistance from their children: own saving crowds out “free” informal
care from children on a one to one basis. Observe also that equation (8) contains no terms
relating to ∂m/∂s. This is because, with m(β0) = s, the derivatives of EU with respect to β0
cancel out.
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that H ′(s) > U ′(s).18 Under this assumption, equation
(8) implies H ′(sLF ) > 1.19 Consequently, dependent parents who do not receive informal care
are under-insured.20 The question is if private insurance markets can take care of this under-
insurance. The important point to bear in mind here is that because of the personalized nature
16A corner solution at s = 0 can be excluded by the assumption that U ′(0) = ∞. However, a corner solution
at s = wT , yielding c = 0, cannot be ruled out. To avoid a tedious and not very insightful multiplication of cases
we assume throughout the paper that the constraint c ≥ 0 is not binding in equilibrium (even when first period
income is taxed to finance social LTC).
17The second-order condition is given by
(1− pi)U ′′ (s) + piF (β0)H ′′ (s) + pif(β0)H ′ (s) ∂β0
∂s
< 0.
Or, substituting for dβ0/ds,
(1− pi)U ′′ (s) + piH ′′ (s) [F (β0)− β0f(β0)] < 0,
for which the concavity of F (β) represents a sufficient condition.
18See Ameriks et al. (2019) and Lillard and Weiss (1997) who find that “a fall into poor health raises the
marginal utility of consumption”.
19Assume the contrary so that H ′(sLF ) ≤ 1. This implies F (β0(sLF ))H ′
(
sLF
)
< 1 resulting in U ′
(
sLF
)
<
H ′
(
sLF
)
< 1. Hence the left-hand side of (8), a weighted average of U ′
(
sLF
)
and H ′
(
sLF
)
, must also be less
than one. And we have a contradiction.
20Full insurance is achieved when H ′ (e) = 1; i.e. when the benefit of one extra dollar of consumption when
dependent is equal to its cost.
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of informal care, one can never insure himself against lack or insufficient care from one’s children.
However, private insurance markets for dependency can exist—at least in principle. We now
examine the implications of such a market for the under-insurance we have discovered under
laissez faire.
2.2 Actuarially-fair private insurance markets for dependency
Let δ denote the amount of insurance against old-age dependency that a parent purchases at
the actuarially fair premium of piδ. Children then expect their parents to have s + δ resources
of their own to consume in case of dependency rather than s. Turning to the parents, their
expected utility (7) will change to
EU = wT − s− piδ + (1− pi)U (s) + pi
[
H (s+ δ)F (β0) +
∫ ∞
β0
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
. (9)
Maximizing EU with respect to s and δ, and continuing to assume that the solution for s is
interior, there are two possible outcomes.
Case (i): The solution for δ is interior. Under this circumstance, the optimal value of δ and
of s, denoted by sFI to distinguish it from sLF , satisfy equations21
(1− pi)U ′ (sFI)+ piF (β0 (sFI + δ))H ′ (sFI + δ) = 1, (10)
F (β0
(
sFI + δ
)
)H ′
(
sFI + δ
)
= 1. (11)
Again note the absence of derivatives with respect to β0 in the first-order conditions (10)–(11).
In this case, because m(β0) = s+ δ, the derivatives cancel out. Substituting from equation (11)
into equation (10), we have22
U ′
(
sFI
)
= 1, (12)
H ′
(
sFI + δ
)
= 1/F (β0) > 1. (13)
Equation (12) shows that healthy parents’ consumption is at its first-best optimum (i.e., its
marginal benefit is equal to its marginal cost); equation (13) shows that dependent parents who
would not receive informal care are under-insured.
Case (ii): The problem yields a corner solution for δ. This arises if, at δ = 0,
F (β0(s))H
′ (s)− 1 ≤ 0.
Under this circumstance δ = 0 and equation (11) is no longer valid. Setting δ = 0 in equation
(10) yields
(1− pi)U ′ (s) + piF (β0 (s))H ′ (s) = 1.
21We continue to assume that the constraint c ≥ 0 is not binding in equilibrium.
22The second-order conditions are
piH ′′ (s+ δ) [F (β0)− β0f(β0)] < 0,
pi(1− pi)U ′′ (s)H ′′ (s+ δ) [F (β0)− β0f(β0)] > 0,
which are satisfied due to the concavity of H(·), U(·) and F (β).
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This is identical to the corresponding first-order condition in the absence of private insurance
markets. Consequently, in this case,
s = sLF ,
H ′ (s) = H ′
(
sLF
)
> 1,
and we are back to the laissez faire solution in the absence of private insurance markets. This
can arise if F (β0 (s)) is “sufficiently” small. When almost all parents expects to be able to
rely on informal care, the benefit of insurance is small and outweighed by its cost in terms of
expected crowding out.
We also prove in Appendix A that
sFI < sLF < sFI + δ.
This is to say that private insurance markets lower private savings while increasing parents’
overall resources for old-age consumption. Put differently, parents’ purchases of private insurance
more than make up for the decline in their savings. Intuitively, the availability of private
insurance markets has two implications. On the one hand, active private insurance markets
make it less expensive for a parent to insure himself so that sFI + δ > sLF . On the other hand,
when parents are able to insure themselves against dependency, they are effectively buying some
insurance against not getting informal care when dependent. This reduces the self-insurance
benefits of private savings and with it the amount of savings (sFI < sLF ).
Two lessons are to be learnt from this discussion. First, actuarially-fair insurance markets
for dependency improve the laissez faire outcome. Healthy parents will have equal marginal
benefit of consumption in the two periods of their lives, while dependent parents increase their
overall self insurance. Second, while private insurance mitigates the under-insurance problem,
it does not eliminate it. Private insurance markets notwithstanding, H ′
(
sFI + δ
)
> 1 so that
dependent parents who would not receive informal care continue to remain under-insured. The
reason is, of course, the unavailability of insurance against lack or insufficient informal care.
Private markets cannot solve this problem.
We summarize the main results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the context of a model with uncertain altruism represented by equations (1)–
(2), actuarially-fair private insurance markets for dependency:
(a) Increase the overall amount of self-insurance by parents while reducing the portion
due to private savings.
(b) Leave dependent parents who are not getting informal care under-insured.
Having established that uncertainty surrounding children’s altruism creates a potential role
for the government in providing LTC, we next study the design of LTC policies. Observe that
we implicitly assume that informal care, a, is not observable. The only exception is that a = 0
can be enforced to implement an OO policy. If a were fully observable, we could of course
do better by using a nonlinear transfer scheme g(a) to screen for the β’s. This would amount
to characterizing the optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms of which TU, OO, and mixed
policies are special cases.
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3 Topping up
The government provides LTC insurance, g, to all dependent elderly whether or not they receive
informal care. This is done in the form of a good which is non-exclusive in the sense that it can
be topped up by a and s. The policy is financed through a proportional tax at rate τ on the
parents’ first-period exogenous income. The parents’ expected utility is then given by
EUTU = w (1− τ)T − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piE [H (s+ g + a∗(β, s, g))] , (14)
where a∗(β, s, g) ≥ 0 is care provided by children (which is shown in the next subsection to also
depend on g). Preferences of grown-up children continue to be represented by equation (2), with
e = s+ g + a. Once again, we proceed by backward induction and start with the last stage.
3.1 Stage 3: The children’s choice
Children allocate an amount a ≥ 0 of their income y to assist their dependent parents (given
the parents’ savings s and the government’s provision of g). The optimal level of transfers, a∗,
is found through the maximization of equation (2). The first-order condition with respect to a,
assuming an interior solution, is given by
−1 + βH ′ (s+ g + a) = 0.
Setting a = 0 in above gives the minimum level of β for which a child provides a positive level of
care to his parent who has saved s and receives g from the government. Denote this threshold
by β˜ to differentiate it from β0, the threshold in the Laissez fair when there is no government
provision. Thus, define β˜(s+ g) such that
β˜ (s+ g) ≡ 1/H ′ (s+ g) . (15)
Observe that, from (15) and (5), β˜ (·) has the same functional form and β0 (·). Distinguishing
between the two is helpful in keeping track of the solutions in different settings. Clearly, then,
β˜ (s+ g) > β0 (s) for all g > 0.
It follows from (15) that, when β ≥ β˜ (s+ g), a∗ satisfies
e = s+ g + a∗ =
(
H ′
)−1( 1
β
)
≡ m (β) . (16)
As depicted by the solid line in Figure 3, for all β ≥ β˜ (s+ g) the consumption of dependent
parents m(β) is exactly the same as in the laissez faire. Thus, when children’s altruism is in
this range, government assistance crowds out informal care one to one (at the intensive margin).
The crowding out stops when caregivers are brought to a corner solution; i.e. for β = β˜ (s+ g).
When β < β˜ (s+ g), no informal care is provided, a∗ = 0 and e = s+ g > m(β). In this range,
g increases the total informal care beyond what parents receive through self-insurance and we
have ∂e/∂g = 1. Finally, same as with dβ0 (s) /ds > 0, we have
∂β˜ (s+ g)
∂g
=
dβ˜ (s+ g)
d (s+ g)
= − H
′′
(H ′)2
> 0. (17)
As the total amount of formal care increases, the degree of altruism necessary to yield a positive
level of informal care increases (for a given level of a parents’ saving).
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β0(sTU ) β0(sLF ) β˜0(g + sTU )
g + sTU (g)
β
Old-age consumption
sTU (g)
sLF
m(β)
0
Figure 2: Topping up – Consumption of dependent parents as a function of the children’s degree
of altruism
3.2 Stage 2: The parents’ choice
Recall that parents are dependent with probability pi and healthy with probability (1 − pi).
Substituting for a∗ from (16) in the parents’ expected utility function (14), we have
EUTU = w (1− τ)T −s+(1− pi)U (s)+pi
[
H (s+ g)F (β˜ (s+ g)) +
∫ ∞
β˜(s+g)
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
.
Parents choose s to maximize EUTU . Again, with m
(
β˜ (s+ g)
)
= s + g, the derivatives of
EUTU with respect to β0 cancel out. The optimal value of s, assuming an interior solution,
satisfies23
(1− pi)U ′ (s) + piF (β˜ (s+ g))H ′ (s+ g) = 1. (18)
Denote the solution to equation (18) by sTU (g). Substituting sTU (g) for s in (18), the resulting
relationship holds for all values of g. Totally differentiating this relationship, while making use
of (17) and of the concavity of F (·), yields
dsTU
dg
= −
piH ′′
(
sTU + g
) [
F (β˜)− β˜f
(
β˜
)]
(1− pi)U ′′ (sTU ) + piH ′′ (sTU + g)
[
F (β˜)− β˜f
(
β˜
)] < 0. (19)
Consequently, sTU (g) decreases with g. This is not surprising. Savings play a self-insurance role
for the dependent parents in case they do not receive informal care in addition to serving as the
sole source of consumption for healthy parents. As public LTC becomes available, the expected
self-insurance benefits associated with s become less important. Parents will be able to count
on g even when their children fail to deliver; consequently the marginal benefit of s decreases in
g. The above expression also shows dsTU/dg > −1 so that g does not fully crowd out sTU .
23The second-order condition, upon substitution for ∂β˜/∂(s+ g) from (17), is given by
(1− pi)U ′′ (s) + piH ′′ (s+ g)
[
F (β˜)− β˜f
(
β˜
)]
< 0,
which is satisfied due to the concavity of F (·).
12
Finally, substitute sTU (g) for s in (15) to write β˜ as a function of g only:
β˜ (g) ≡ β˜ (sTU (g) + g) .
Totally differentiating β˜ with respect to g yields
dβ˜ (g)
dg
=
∂β˜
(
sTU (g) + g
)
∂g
[
1 +
dsTU
dg
]
<
∂β˜
∂g
|s.
Because g affects savings negatively, the positive direct effect of g on β˜ diminishes. Substituting
the expressions for ∂β˜/ ∂g and dsTU/dg, from (17) and (19), into the above and simplifying
results in
dβ˜ (g)
dg
= − H
′′ (sTU + g)
[H ′ (sTU + g)]2
(1− pi)U ′′ (sTU)
(1− pi)U ′′ (sTU ) + piH ′′ (sTU + g)
[
F (β˜)− β˜f
(
β˜
)] > 0.
An increase in public LTC reduces the likelihood of children providing informal care and we
have crowding out at the extensive margin.
3.3 Stage 1: The optimal policy
Government determines the optimal values of τ and g in such as way as to maximize the parents’
optimized value of EUTU determined in stage 2. The optimization is subject to the government’s
budget constraint
τwT = pig. (20)
Substitute sTU (g) for s and pig/wT for τ into EUTU to rewrite it as a function of g only. The
government’s Lagrangian associated with the maximization of EUTU with respect to g is
£TU ≡ wT − pig − sTU (g) + (1− pi)U (sTU (g))+
pi
[
F (β˜
(
sTU (g) + g
)
)H
(
sTU (g) + g
)
+
∫ ∞
β˜(sTU (g)+g)
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
.
Differentiating £TU with respect to g yields, using the envelope theorem,
d£TU
dg
= pi
[
F (β˜)H ′
(
sTU (g) + g
)− 1] . (21)
The first term in the bracketed expression on the right-hand side reflects the benefits of an
increase in g. A dependent parent who does not receive informal care (their children’s β is
smaller than β˜), gains H ′
(
sTU (g) + g
)
; the remaining dependent parents gain no benefit due
to the crowding out effect of g on informal care. The second term reflects the unit cost of g.
To determine if the government will in fact provide LTC, evaluate the sign of d£TU/dg at
g = 0. One possibility is to have
F
[
β˜
(
sTU (0)
)]
H ′
(
sTU (0)
)− 1 > 0,
In this case, there will be an interior solution for g, and τ, characterized by
H ′
(
sTU
(
gTU
)
+ gTU
)
=
1
F
[
β˜ (sTU (gTU ) + gTU )
] > 1. (22)
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Consequently, the optimal TU does not provide full insurance. Moreover, substituting from
(22) into (18) results in
U ′(d) = U ′
(
sTU
(
gTU
))
= 1,
which implies that healthy parents’ consumption is at its first-best optimum (i.e., its marginal
benefit is equal to its marginal cost).
A different outcome occurs if
F
[
β˜
(
sTU (0)
)]
H ′
(
sTU (0)
)− 1 ≤ 0,
In this case, the solution is given by g = τ = 0 and government need not provide any TU
insurance. This occurs if F [β˜
(
sTU (0)
)
] is sufficiently small. Under this circumstance, the
probability that children provide free informal care is “large enough” as to make the benefit of
insurance very small and outweighed by its cost. The laissez faire leaves some individuals (those
whose children have a β < β˜) without LTC benefits other than self-insurance. This is inefficient,
but the TU policy we consider here cannot do any better.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a topping-up scheme financed by a proportional tax on earnings. Let
sTU (g) solve
(1− pi)U ′ (sTU (g))+ piF (β˜)H ′ (sTU (g)+ g) = 1,
where
β˜ =
1
H ′ (sTU (g) + g)
.
(i) Public LTC insurance is not effective in supplementing informal care and gTU = 0 if
F
[
β˜
(
sTU (0)
)]
H ′
(
sTU (0)
)− 1 ≤ 0.
(ii) Otherwise, there is an interior solution gTU > 0 implicitly defined by
H ′
(
sTU
(
gTU
)
+ gTU
)
=
1
F
[
β˜ (sTU (g) + g)
] .
(a) This relationship balances insurance benefit against the crowding out cost of informal
care.
(b) Public LTC reduces parents’ private savings. as well as the likelihood of children
providing informal care.
(c) There is crowding out at intensive and extensive margins.
(iii) Under both (i) and (ii), H ′ (·) > 1 so that there is less than full insurance.
4 Opting out
Assume now that the government provides LTC on an exclusive basis in the sense that it cannot
be topped up by a or s. The policy is only relevant when the amount of the assistance, G,
exceeds a parent’s private savings, s; otherwise, public assistance would be of no use to the
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parents. To receive it, one has to give up his own private savings to the government. Its net
cost to the government is thus G− s which makes it on a par with providing g in a topping-up
policy. The program is voluntary and one can decide not to participate; that is, to opt out and
rely instead on his own savings and children’s assistance.24
4.1 Stage 3: The children’s choice
Children’s preferences continue to be given by (2). Hence their utility is equal to
u = y − a+ βH (s+ a) , (23)
if they provide informal care to their parents; and
u = y + βH (G) , (24)
if they decide not to assist their parents (who will then rely exclusively on public LTC insurance).
If they provide care, they will do it at a level a∗ that maximizes their utility given by (23). Hence
a∗ satisfies βH ′ (s+ a∗) = 1 or s+a∗ = (H ′)−1 (1/β) = m (β). This implies that with assistance
from their children, parents’ consumption will be equal to its level in the laissez-faire. Of course,
children provide assistance only if it increases their utility above the level they get when they
allow the parents to rely exclusively on public assistance.
Each child thus compares (23), evaluated at a∗, with (24) and provides care if
β [H(m(β))−H (G)] > (m(β)− s) .
In words, children provide informal care only if the utility gain from altruism β[H(m(β))−H (G)]
exceeds the cost of care a∗ = m(β)− s. By contrast, parents would prefer to opt out whenever
m(β) > G. This implies that, whenever children decide to assist their parents, parents will
definitely opt out from public LTC. Observe that the left-hand side of the above inequality is
increasing in β for all m(β) > G.25 Consequently, for each value of G and s, there exists a
β̂(G, s) such that all children with β > β̂ provide care and all children with β ≤ β̂ provide no
assistance. This threshold level, β̂(G, s), is implicitly defined by
β̂
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
]
−
(
m(β̂)− s
)
= 0. (25)
24In the US, eligibility for Medicaid, whose services include LTC, is based on having minimal private resources.
This creates a perverse incentive for “not-quite-rich” people to transfer their savings to their relatives to become
eligible. The OO policy we are considering allows all parents to participate as long as they are prepared to
“transfer” their savings to the government.
25The derivative of the left-hand side with respect to β is
[H(m(β))−H (G)] + [βH ′ (m(β))− 1] ∂m
∂β
.
If children do not provide care, ∂m/∂β = 0. If they do, βH ′ (m(β))− 1 = 0. The above expression thus reduces
to
[H(m(β))−H (G)] ,
which is positive for all m(β) > G.
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Differentiating (25) with respect to G and s yields
∂β̂
∂G
=
β̂H ′ (G)[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] > 0, (26)
∂β̂
∂s
= − 1[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] < 0. (27)
In the topping-up scheme, the threshold level of β moved positively with g + s. The higher
either g or s, the less likely it was that children provide assistance (top up). Here a similar
logic applies to G. The higher is G, the happier the children are with public LTC and the less
inclined they are to provide informal care. Hence the threshold level increases with G. On the
other hand, unlike in the topping up case, the threshold with opting out is decreasing in s. The
reason is that a higher level of s reduces the amount of care the children have to provide to
surpass a given level of public LTC, G.
Figure 3 illustrates how, under opting out, the dependent parents’ consumption varies with
their children’s degree of altruism (solid line). If β ≤ β̂, dependent parents consume G; if
β > β̂, they opt out and consume m(β) (which is equal to their laissez faire consumption).
However, there is now a discontinuity in the level of m at β̂ (unlike at β˜ in the topping-up
regime). The discontinuity follows from equation (25) which shows that at β̂, the marginal child
is just indifferent between his parent consuming G or consuming m(β̂). The first option costs
the children nothing and the second a∗ = m(β) − s > 0. This implies, through equation (25),
that m(β̂) > G so that the parents are strictly better off to the right of β̂.26 In words, under
OO, children provide care only if m(β) is sufficiently larger than G to make up for the cost of
care.
β0(sOO) β̂(G, sOO)
G
β
Old-age consumption
sOO(G)
m(β)
0
Figure 3: Opting out: consumption of dependent parents as a function of children’s degree of
altruism
26This also explains why, whenever children are willing to provide care, their parents accept it and forego G.
Intuitively, while the children are altruistic they have to pay for the cost of care that comes free to the parents.
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4.2 Stage 2: The parents’ choice
The parents’ expected utility is
EUOO = w (1− τ)T − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi
[
H (G)F (β̂) +
∫ ∞
β̂
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
.
Maximizing EUOO with respect to s, and assuming an interior solution, the optimal value of s
satisfies
(1− pi)U ′ (s)− pif(β̂)
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] ∂β̂
∂s
= 1, (28)
Note that in this case the derivatives with respect to β̂ do not cancel out. The marginal child
is indifferent between providing care or not; but not his parent. And it is the children, and not
the parents, who incur the cost of informal care. Substituting for ∂β̂/∂s from (27) into (28),
one can rewrite the first-order condition for the maximization of EUOO with respect to s as27
(1− pi)U ′ (s) + pif(β̂ (G, s)) = 1. (29)
The second term on the left-hand side of (29), or equivalently (28), represents the positive effect
of s on the likelihood that children provide assistance. Under OO saving is not useful in case
of dependency: It is either fully taxed or is fully crowded out by the informal care. Yet saving
affects the likelihood that children provide help. We have found that ∂β̂/∂s < 0 under OO,
meaning that private savings increase the likelihood of informal care under OO. Now, because
parents are always better off under family assistance than under public assistance, this effect
enhances the desirability of savings under OO.
Denote the solution to equation (29) by sOO(G) and substitute sOO (G) for s in (29). The
resulting equation holds for all values of G > sOO(G). Its differentiation with respect to G yields
dsOO
dG
=
−pif ′(β̂) ∂β̂∂G
(1− pi)U ′′ (sOO (G)) + pif ′(β̂)∂β̂∂s
< 0, (30)
where the sign follows from the concavity of F as long as the second-order condition for max-
imization of EUOO is satisfied. Consequently, as with TU , sOO(G) decreases with G. This
is because the benefit that saving provides in terms of self-insurance decreases as G increases.
Saving does not provide any benefit to the parents who receive public LTC because it will be
taxed away. However, an increase in G lowers the likelihood that children provide informal care.
This is measured by the numerator of (30) and explains the negative sign of dsOO/dG.
Finally, with sOO being determined by G, one can rewrite the threshold level of altruism,
β̂(G, s), solely as a function of G (as was the case under TU in terms of g). Thus define
β̂(G) ≡ β̂[G, sOO(G)].
27We assume that the second-order condition for maximizing EUOO with respect to s, found from differentiating
the left-hand side of (29),
(1− pi)U ′′ (s) + pif ′(β̂)∂β̂
∂s
< 0,
is satisfied. Unlike the second-order conditions previously encountered, this is not guaranteed with a concave F (·)
which implies f ′ = F ′′ < 0.
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Differentiating this relationship totally with respect to G yields,
dβ̂
dG
=
∂β̂
∂G
+
∂β̂
∂s
dsOO
dG
=
β̂H ′ (G)[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] − 1[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] dsOO
dG
> 0. (31)
This expression accounts for the direct effect of G and for its indirect impact via the induced
variation in sOO; its sign follows from our finding that dsOO/dG < 0. We have crowding out at
the extensive margin.
4.3 Stage 1: The optimal policy
The government’s budget constraint in this case is given by
τwT = piF (β̂)
[
G− sOO(G)] .
It differs from (20), its counterpart in the TU case, in two ways. First, G is offered only to
dependent parents who do not receive informal care (and whose share of the dependent elderly
population is F (β̂)). Second, parents who opt in have to forego their savings. This feature puts
the net insurance benefit of the OO system, G−sOO(G), on par with that of the TU system, g.
It also means that only the net benefit of public LTC will have to be financed by taxing wages.
Substituting the above budget constraint into the parents’ optimized value of EUOO, we are
left with choosing G to maximize
£OO ≡ wT − piF (β̂) [G− sOO(G)]− sOO(G) + (1− pi)U (sOO(G))+ (32)
pi
[∫ ∞
β̂
H (m (β)) dF (β) + F (β̂)H (G)
]
.
Differentiating £OO with respect to G yields, using the envelope theorem,28
d£OO
dG
= pi
F (β̂)H ′ (G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− pi f(β̂)
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] ∂β̂
∂G︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−pi F (β̂)
(
1− ds
OO
dG
)
+ (G− sOO)f(β̂)dβ̂
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
. (33)
This expression shows that an increase in G has three different effects, labeled A, B and C. Term
A measures the expected insurance benefit that G provides to parents who opt in. The public
LTC insurance benefit also affects the extent of informal care through the extensive margin.
By increasing β̂, it reduces the number of informal caregivers. The cost of this adjustment
is measured by term B. Finally, C expresses the impact of an increase in G on first-period
consumption. It accounts for the induced adjustments in sOO and β̂.
Comparing expression (33) to its counterpart in the TU case given by equation (21), we note
the following points. Term A, which indicates insurance benefit, has a similar counterpart in
28The derivative of the parents’ objective function with respect to s is zero. Consequently, the terms pertaining
to the induced variation of s, including ∂β̂/∂G, vanish for the parents’ objective function but not for the budget
constraint. This explains why we have ∂β̂/∂G in term B but dβ̂/dG in term C.
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TU (except that β̂ replaces β˜). Term B is absent in the TU case because the extensive margin
crowding out via β˜ has no first-order effect on parents’ utility. Finally, term C, which captures
the marginal cost of increasing assistance in terms of first-period consumption, has one as its
counterpart under TU (the cost of crowding out at the intensive margin).
Substitute for ∂β̂/∂G from (26), and for dβ̂/dG from (31), into (33) and rearrange the terms.
An interior solution for G will then be characterized by{
F (β̂)− f(β̂)β̂
[
1 +
GOO − sOO
H(m(β̂))−H (GOO)
]}
H ′
(
GOO
)
=
F (β̂)
(
1− ds
OO
dG
)
−
[
f(β̂)
GOO − sOO
H(m(β̂))−H (GOO)
]
dsOO
dG
.
The bracketed terms on the left-hand side of this expression is smaller than F (β̂). On the other
hand, because dsOO/dG < 0, the whole of the right-hand side is larger than F (β̂). Consequently,
H ′(GOO) > 1; there is less than full insurance for the dependent parents who opt in under an
OO policy.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider an opting out scheme financed by a proportional tax on earnings.
Define the degree of altruism of the marginal child β̂ implicitly by
β̂
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
]
−
[
m(β̂)− sOO(G)
]
= 0,
and let sOO (G) solve
(1− pi)U ′ (s) + pif(β̂ (G, s)) = 1.
(i) It will not be desirable to provide LTC on an OO basis, if at G = sOO,
F (β̂)H ′ (G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− f(β̂)
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] ∂β̂
∂G︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
− F (β̂)
(
1− ds
OO
dG
)
+ (G− sOO)f(β̂) dβ̂
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
≤ 0.
(ii) Otherwise, the solution is interior and defined by
A−B − C = 0,
with G = GOO.
(a) This relationship balances the expected insurance benefit, A, against the cost of the
induced crowding out at the extensive margin, B, plus the budgetary cost C (the reduction in the
parents’ first-period consumption).
(b) An increase in public LTC reduces parents’ private savings.
(c) There is crowding out at the extensive margin.
(iii) Under both (i) and (ii), H ′ (G) > 1 so that there is less than full insurance.
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5 Topping up versus opting out
The previous sections have shown that under both TU and OO policies public provision of
LTC crowds out informal care. Under TU, crowding out occurs at both intensive and extensive
margins. At the intensive margin, TU crowds out informal care by −1 < da∗/dg < 0. At the
extensive margin, TU reduces the number of informal caregivers: dβ˜/dg > 0. However, since
the informal care provided by the marginal child β˜ is equal to zero, this has no first-order impact
on the parents’ utility. Under OO, crowding out occurs only at the extensive margin. At the
intensive margin, there is no direct crowding out. Indeed, indirectly, an increase in G leads to an
increase in informal care via the reduction in private savings it induces. At the extensive margin,
dβ̂/dG > 0, and there is crowding out as the number of caregivers declines. This crowding out
does have a first-order effect on the parents’ utility: The parents of marginal children β̂ are
strictly better off when they receive informal care.
The precise comparison of the TU and OO policies is somewhat complicated. To understand
the tradeoffs that are involved, we construct a sufficient condition for OO to yield a higher level
of welfare than TU. The following proposition is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 4 Consider an optimal TU scheme gTU with saving sTU and an optimal OO
scheme GOO with saving sOO. Let βA ≡ β̂(gTU +sTU , sTU ) denote the threshold level of β below
which no assistance is provided to the parents under an OO policy with G = gTU + sTU and s =
sTU . Then βA > β˜(gTU + sTU ) and the OO scheme dominates if
[
1− F (βA)] gTU − ∫ βA
β˜
[H (m (β))−H(gTU + sTU )]dF (β) ≥ 0. (34)
To arrive at this condition, one starts from an optimal TU policy and provides a condition
that ensures its replication under OO will be welfare improving. The first term on the left-
hand side of (34) measures the benefit of switching to OO while keeping the net transfer per
beneficiary, gTU , and savings, sTU , constant. The benefit in switching comes from the fact that
under OO children with β > βA transfer G−sTU in resources to their parents; but not so under
TU. The second term measures the cost of switching to OO. The cost arises because children
with a β in the interval [β˜, βA] who transfer m(β) − (gTU + sTU) to their parents under TU
would no longer do so under OO. Roughly speaking, OO dominates if the share of children with
a high degree of altruism is large enough; that is, if 1− F (βA) is sufficiently large. This makes
sense in that, for this population, switching to OO avoids the crowding out at the intensive
margin that the TU policy induces.29
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 4 (where β has an upper-bound β+). The solid gray and
solid black lines represent the consumption of dependent parents under an optimal TU policy
and an OO policy with G = gTU + sTU and s = sTU . The parents of children with β in the
interval [βA, β+] have the same level of second-period consumption m (β) under TU and OO
policies; yet they incur different costs in attaining this identical consumption level. They save
29Generally speaking, not targeting is more wasteful when the targeted group is small because it entails unnec-
essary transfers to a larger group of people. In our model, 1 − F (β˜) is the proportion of the not-targeted group
in the population.
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the same amount, but the financing of gTU in their old-age consumption falls on different people.
Under TU, the financing comes from all of the parents through higher wage taxes. Under OO,
it is the children with a β in [βA, β+] who pay for it.30 Area B in Figure 4 is a representation
of what parents gain under OO in comparison to TU. On the negative side, under OO parents
whose children have a β in the interval [β˜, βA] would each lose m(β)− (gTU + sTU) in transfers
that they would have received under TU. Area C in Figure 4 represents the loss to these parents.
The size of area B depends on the number of dependent parents receiving family help under
OO, 1−F (βA), as well as the level of public insurance, gTU . The size of area C depends on the
number of people in the interval βA− β˜ as well as on how much less each parent in this interval
consumes under OO, m(β)− (gTU + sTU). The optimal regime depends on the respective sizes
of the two areas.31 Observe that the comparison hinges crucially on the distribution of the
altruism parameter, F (β), and on the degree of concavity of the utility function H(·).
βA β+
Old-age consumption
β0
m(β)
0 β˜
gTU + sTU
= G
sTU = s
C
B
Figure 4: Topping up vs Opting out
To illustrate the interplay of the factors that determine the optimality of TU and OO policies,
we next turn to a numerical example. Unlike the discussion above, the example compares the
two regimes unconditionally. Assume, in line with the health economics literature, that old-age
dependency is captured by a monetary loss L. Thus write the utility function associated with
old-age consumption by U(x) if healthy and H(x− L) if dependent. The specifications used in
the example are U(x) = ln(x) and H(x−L) = ln(x−L). We assume that β is distributed over
the interval [0, β+] according to the cumulative density function F (β) = µ+ (1− µ)β/β+ with
µ ∈ (0, 1). This distribution implies that a fraction µ of the children are not altruistic and the
remaining 1 − µ altruistic ones are distributed uniformly over the interval [0, β+]. The values
we consider are 2.5, 3, and 3.5 for β+; and 20% and 30% for µ. We further assume that the
30The tax rate is τ = pigTU/wT under TU and τ = piF
(
βA
)
gTU/wT under OO.
31This argument is purely illustrative of the tradeoff as the areas cannot directly be compared. First, area B
does not account for the distribution of β. To obtain the effective cost savings one has to multiply area B by
[1 − F (βA)]. Second, area C represents the loss in consumption and not in utility. Furthermore, the sum is not
weighted by the density.
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µ = 0.2 µ = 0.3
β+ = 2.5 β+ = 3 β+ = 3.5 β+ = 2.5 β+ = 3 β+ = 3.5
Laissez β0 0.231 0.219 0.211 0.313 0.301 0.292
Faire sLF 1.231 1.219 1.211 1.313 1.301 1.292
EULF 0.730 0.797 0.854 0.663 0.720 0.769
β˜ 0.294 0.273 0.259 0.417 0.391 0.375
Topping sTU 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
up g 0.294 0.273 0.2592 0.417 0.391 0.375
EUTU 0.744 0.810 0.866 0.689 0.744 0.791
β̂ 0.845 0.915 0.976 0.313 1.138 1.209
Opting sOO 0.595 0.577 0.565 0.313 0.566 0.556
out G 1.193 1.212 1.230 0.000 1.286 1.308
EUOO 0.742 0.835 0.913 0.663 0.742 0.814
Table 1: Numerical illustrations with U(x) = ln(x), H(x) = ln(x− 1), F (β) = µ+ (1−µ)β/β+,
wT = 2, pi = 0.5.
probability of dependency is pi = 0.5, the first-period exogenous income is equal to two, and the
monetary loss L is equal to one.
Table 1 reports the laissez-faire allocation and the optimal allocations attainable under TU
and OO regimes (for the different distributions of the altruism parameters considered). The
regime that yields a higher EU dominates; it is highlighted in bold for each configuration of
parameters. Observe that, in our examples, OO always results in more crowding out at the
extensive margin than TU (i.e., β̂ > β˜). For a given µ, a higher β+ shifts the mass distribution
towards higher levels of altruism, implying that the OO policy becomes cheaper and thus more
attractive. Conversely, given β+, a higher µ implies fewer children with high levels of altruism
and makes it less likely that the OO policy dominates. Indeed, the configuration of a high µ
and a low β+ in our example (µ = 0.3, β+ = 2.5), implies that there is no OO regime that can
improve the parents’ welfare over its laissez faire level.
6 Opting-out-cum-transfers
Parents’ expected utility in our model is determined not just by how much they decide to save
but also by the decision of their children as to whether or not to assist their parents if they
become dependent. Under the TU and OO schemes we have been studying, the government
attempts to influence both of these decisions through its choice of a public LTC.32 One would
expect that the government should be able to do better (or at least just as well), if it can find
another policy instrument to affect these two sets of decisions. What is needed is an instrument
that affects parents who would receive informal care and those who would not differently. A
tax/transfer policy carried out in period one, when the parents are identical and the children
32The wage tax is not an independent instrument; the magnitude of LTC provision determines it through the
government’s budget constraint.
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have not grown up yet, cannot do this. The trick is to fine-tune the OO policy and combine it
with a transfer to, or tax on, the parents who opt out.33 The basic idea is to increase the total
size of transfers from children to their parents through the phenomenon of crowding out, both
the extensive and the intensive margin.
A positive transfer to parents lowers the children’s cost of providing informal care; thus
encouraging more children to opt out and assist their parents. This is good for the parents.
While children pay for the cost of informal care, the cost of public LTC is borne by the parents.
Increasing the number of children who opt out and assist their parents, however, is not the only
effect of this policy. There is a downside to it as well which comes in the form of the crowding
out at the intensive margin. The children who already assist their parents under a pure OO
system, will now be able to cut their current transfers by an amount equal to the government
transfers (while keeping the parents’ consumption unchanged).34 However, the cost of transfers
is borne by the parents themselves in terms of extra wage taxes in the first period. With the
extensive margin and intensive margin effects of transfers on the parents’ expected utility going
in opposite directions, the second instrument need not necessarily be a positive transfer. It
may very well be a tax (paid in the second period by the parents who opt out).35 The upshot
is that the dependent parents who opt out should be given a positive transfer if the extensive
margin effect dominates, and be taxed if the intensive margin effect dominates. Either way, to
implement it, the first-period tax rate on the parents’ wages must be adjusted. The adjustment
is upward if the second-period transfer is positive and downward if negative. Effectively, the
government is enabled to treat ex ante identical parents differently (as far as their tax and
transfers are concerned).
The policy we consider thus consists of two instruments: a public and exclusive LTC provision
of G to dependent parents whose children do not assist them in exchange for their savings and
a positive or negative transfer of g to dependent parents whose children do take care of them.
In what follows, for ease in exposition, we shall refer only to a positive transfer. However, as
we proceed, it will become clear under what circumstances one should rely on a transfer or on
a tax.
6.1 Stage 3: The children’s choice
If children decide to provide care, the optimal amount of family assistance a∗ is again such that
the dependent parents consumption is equal to its laissez faire level, m(β). And, as previously,
children provide assistance only if it gives them a higher utility than letting parents consume the
exclusive LTC that the government provides. There exists a β(G, s+g) such that all parents with
children whose β > β opt out, while parents with children whose β ≤ β receive no assistance
33Gahvari and Mattos (2007) use a similar argument to rationalize conditional cash transfer programs in de-
veloping countries (such as Bolsa-Escola in Brazil and PROGRESA in Mexico). There the transfers are given to
those who participate in a “free” publicly-provided program in order to encourage opting in; here it is given to
those who opt out in order to encourage opting out.
34This second effect is absent in the existing conditional cash transfer programs referred to above.
35Since these parents keep their savings, if the policy consists of a tax, they will be paying it from their savings.
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and opt in. This threshold β(G, s+ g) is defined by
β
[
H(m(β))−H (G)]− (m(β)− s− g) = 0. (35)
Differentiating (35) with respect to G, g, and s yields
∂β
∂G
=
βH ′ (G)
H(m(β))−H (G) > 0, (36)
∂β
∂s
=
∂β
∂g
= − 1
H(m(β))−H (G) < 0. (37)
Observe that G and s have the same effects on β as in the pure OO scheme. The effect of g on
β is identical to the one of s because s+ g now plays the role that s did in the pure OO scheme.
6.2 Stage 2: The parents’ choice
Parents choose s to maximize their expected utility
EU = w (1− τ)T − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi
[
H (G)F (β) +
∫ ∞
β
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
,
which, except for the position of the marginal child, is identical to the EU under the pure OO
scheme. Observe that g affects EU only through β. This is because parents’ consumption with
children’s assistance is m (β) whether or not they receive a transfer from the government. The
derivative of EU with respect to s is
∂EU
∂s
= (1− pi)U ′ (s)− pif(β) [H(m(β))−H (G)] ∂β
∂s
− 1. (38)
Assuming an interior solution and substituting the expression for ∂β/∂s in the equation above,
one arrives at the following expression for the optimal level of savings36
(1− pi)U ′ (s) + pif(β) = 1. (39)
Equations (35) and (39) jointly determine s and β as functions of G and g: sOC(G, g) and
β (G, g) ≡ β(G, sOC(G, g) + g). Differentiating this system of equations with respect to G and
g, we show in Appendix A that
∂β
∂G
> 0,
∂sOC
∂G
< 0 and
∂β
∂g
< 0,
∂sOC
∂g
> 0 . (40)
As one would expect, an increase in G affects the location of the marginal child and the parents’
savings similarly as it did under the pure OO scenario. An increase in g, on the other hand, has
opposite effects to those found for the TU scheme. There, the prospect of a higher consumption
level for dependent parents made it less likely for children to help; it thus increased β˜. Here, in
deciding to provide assistance, the children base their decision on what their parents get without
36We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied:
(1− pi)U ′′(s)− pi f
′(β)
H(m(β))−H (G) < 0.
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their help, G, and what it costs them to provide help (m (β)− (g + s)). An increase in g reduces
their cost and encourages them to provide assistance. This explains why ∂β/∂g is negative. As
far as saving is concerned, with g being offered to everyone under TU, an increase in g lowered
the self-insurance benefit of savings and thus reduced it. Here, with g being provided only to the
parents who receive assistance, it will have no direct effect on parents. However, since β has a
negative feedback effect on savings, the reduction in β due to an increase in g boosts saving.37.
In Appendix A we also prove that
βH ′ (G) = −
∂sOC
∂G |g
∂sOC
∂g |G
=
dg
dG
∣∣∣∣
sOC
= −
∂β
∂G |g
∂β
∂g |G
=
dg
dG
∣∣∣∣
β
. (41)
These relationships the “marginal rate of substitution” between G and g for a given value of
sOC , and for a given value of β; they also show that the two are equal.38 The effect of a marginal
increase in G on β and sOC can be offset by an increase of βH ′(G) in g.
6.3 Stage 1: The optimal policy
The government’s budget constraint is now given by
τwT = pi
{
F (β)
[
G− sOO(G)]+ (1− F (β)) g} .
The optimal policy is thus found by choosing g and G to maximize
£OC ≡ wT − piF (β) [G− sOC(G, g)]− pi [1− F (β)] g − sOC(G, g)+
+ (1− pi)U (sOC(G, g))+ pi [∫ ∞
β
H (m (β)) dF (β) + F (β)H (G)
]
,
where β = β (G, g). Differentiating £OC partially with respect to G and g, and using the
envelope theorem, one obtains
∂£OC
∂G
= pi
 F (β)H
′ (G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− f(β)
∂β
∂G
∆H︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
− F (β)− F (β)
∂sOC
∂G
+ (G− sOC − g)f(β) ∂β
∂G︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
 ,
(42)
∂£OC
∂g
= pi
 −f(β)
∂β
∂g
∆H︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′
− 1− F (β)− F (β)
∂sOC
∂g
+ (G− sOC − g)f(β)∂β
∂g︸ ︷︷ ︸
C ′
 , (43)
where ∆H ≡ H(m(β))−H (G). Condition (42) has the same formulation as its counterpart in
the pure OO scheme (except that G − sOC − g appears in place of G − sOO). Interpretations
of expressions A,B, and C are also the same and bear no repeating. Turning to condition (43),
37Differentiating (39) with respect to β yields
ds
dβ
=
−pif ′ (β)
(1− pi)U ′′ (s) < 0,
where f ′
(
β
)
= F ′′
(
β
)
< 0 due to the concavity of F (·).
38The equality is due to the fact that neither G nor g appear directly in equation (35).
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there is no term corresponding to A because g is given to the dependent parents who receive
informal care and whose consumption is m (β). As such, and in contrast to G which by virtue of
being given only to parents not receiving informal care provides them with insurance, provides
no insurance benefit. Term B′ corresponds to B and captures the fact that g affects informal
care at the extensive margin (the same as with G albeit in the opposite direction). By reducing
β, it increases the number of children who provide informal care. This is a benefit so that B′
is positive. Term C ′ corresponds to C, reflecting the effects of an increase in g on first-period
consumption. Because g is given to dependent parents who receive informal care, as opposed to
G given to those who do not, its direct impact is measured by 1 − F (β) instead of F (β). The
terms also accounts for the induced adjustments in sOO and β which are similar to adjustments
induced by an increase in G.
To determine the conditions under which parents receiving informal care should be given a
transfer or be taxed, one has to evaluate ∂£OC/∂g at the optimum under a pure OO scheme
(when G = GOO and g = 0). We show in Appendix A that this is given by
∂£OC
∂g
|g=0 = piF (β̂)
[
H ′
(
GOO
)− 1
β̂H ′ (GOO)
]
− pi
[
1− F (β̂)
]
. (44)
The first term on the right-hand side measures the marginal benefit of increasing g. An increase
in g leaving β̂ and sOO unchanged requires a concomitant increase in G which, from (41), is equal
to (dG/dg)
β̂,sOO
= 1/β̂H ′
(
GOO
)
. The resulting increase in insurance benefits, H ′
(
GOO
) − 1,
goes to piF (β̂) dependent parents who do not get informal care.39 The second term measures the
marginal cost of increasing the g transfer going to pi
(
1− F (β̂)
)
dependent parents who receive
informal care. It is in terms of reduced first-period consumption. It immediately follows from
(44) that,
F (β̂)
[
H ′
(
GOO
)− 1] R [1− F (β̂)] β̂H ′ (GOO)⇒ gOC R 0. (45)
Finally, it follows from (44) that at an interior solution for G and for g (positive or negative),
it must be the case that
F (β)
[
H ′
(
GOC
)− 1] = [1− F (β)]βH ′ (GOC) . (46)
That is, the marginal insurance benefit that the opting-out-cum-transfer policy provides must
be equal to its marginal cost in terms of the foregone first-period consumption. Equation (46)
also implies that H ′(GOC) > 1 as long as 1− F (β) > 0. In words, the optimal opting-out-cum-
transfer regime too implies less than full insurance for the parents who do not receive family
help (except when there is an upper bound to β, say β+, and β = β+ so that no child provides
help).
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider an optimal OO policy with an interior solution G = GOO. Replace
this policy with an alternative that supplements the provision of G with a positive or negative
39Another way of looking at the gain is that an increase in g reduces β resulting in a higher number of children
assisting their parents. Consequently, with a smaller number of parents on public LTC, one can help the remaining
ones more.
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Topping up β˜ = 0.391 sTU = 1.000 gTU = 0.391 EUTU = 0.744
Opting out βˆ = 1.138 sOO = 0.566 GOO = 1.286 EUOO = 0.742
Opting-out-
cum-transfers β¯ = 1.210 sOC = 0.566 GOC = 1.900 gOC = −0.566 EUOC = 0.757
Table 2: The three regimes with U(x) = ln(x), H(x) = ln(x − 1), F (β) = µ + (1 − µ)β/β+,
wT = 2, pi = 0.5, µ = 0.3, β+ = 3.
transfer g to dependent parents who opt out and rely on their own private savings and family
informal care. Parents who opt in receive no transfers and, in exchange for their entire savings,
get to consume the publicly-provided G that cannot be topped up.
(a) Such a scheme will never decrease the parents’ expected utility attained under a pure OO
scheme. The transfer g must be positive (negative) if , at g = 0, the insurance benefit of the
last dollar spent on public LTC exceeds (falls short of) its marginal cost in terms of the reduced
first-period consumption. This is shown by condition (45).
(b) Denote the optimal publicly-provided LTC under this new policy by GOC and the optimal
conditional transfer by gOC . Let β = β
(
GOC , gOC
)
, defined by
β
[
H(m(β))−H (GOC)]− (m(β)− sOC − gOC) = 0,
denote the threshold of β below which children will not assist their parents under this policy. Then
GOC and gOC satisfy equation (46). That is, they equate the marginal insurance benefit of the
last dollar spent on LTC to its marginal cost in terms of the foregone first-period consumption.
(c) The policy implies less than full insurance.
(d) Provision of G leads to crowding out at the extensive margin and transfers g, if positive,
to crowding out at the intensive margin and crowding in at the extensive margin.
We make one final observation on combining an OO policy with conditional transfers. This
scheme can potentially enhance welfare not just over a pure OO policy but also over a TU policy
that dominates its pure OO competitor. According to Table 1, when µ = 0.3 and β+ = 3,
the dominant regime is TU with a corresponding EUTU = 0.744 (exceeding EUOO = 0.742
and thus being the preferable policy). However, combining OO with a one-hundred percent
tax on the parents’ private savings (gOC = −0.566), increases the parents’ expected utility to
EUOC = 0.757 thus making the opting-out-cum-transfers the optimal LTC regime. Under this
mixed policy, public LTC would increase from GOO = 1.286 to GOC = 1.900 and the marginal
β from β̂ = 1.138 to β = 1.210. Consequently, the policy entails more crowding out of informal
care at the extensive margin as compared to both OO and TU policies (β > β̂ > β˜). Table 2
illustrates these comparisons.
7 Private insurance markets and public LTC
The three public LTC policy regimes we discussed in previous sections, have ignored the avail-
ability of private insurance markets. It is a straightforward exercise to allow for such markets.
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The formulation and the analysis of the policy regimes remain very much the same as they were
without insurance markets. The derivation of the various expressions and the proofs are also
similar under the two scenarios. To avoid what might look like repetitious presentation, we leave
the details of this exercise to Appendix B. We limit our discussion in this section to making a
few remarks and to presenting a summary of our formally-proved results under Proposition 6.
First, actuarially fair insurance markets render the TU policy redundant as one replicates
the other. The result should not be surprising. Under TU, the government is not more efficient
than a perfectly competitive insurance market. There is nothing a public insurer can do that
markets cannot; public and private insurance are equivalent.
Second, actuarially fair insurance markets do not obviate the usefulness of an OO policy.
Intuitively, public insurance extends insurance to dependent parents whose children do not
assist them. Private insurance companies can replicate this only through an insurance contract
to parents in exchange for their savings with a provision that forbids children to help their
dependent parents. Such a contract is highly unlikely to be enforceable. Public insurance under
OO, by effectively offering insurance against the failure of children to help, may make public
intervention desirable.
Third, if private insurance is purchased, there is no need to supplement an opting-out system
with conditional transfers. This makes sense as private insurance serves the same purpose as
conditional transfers. Fourth, private insurance is of no use if the optimal transfer under an
opting-out-cum-transfer policy, in the absence of private insurance markets, is negative (i.e., a
tax is required). Under this circumstance, nobody will purchase insurance even if one allows for
it. And with no private insurance being purchased, it will be desirable to supplement an OO
system with negative transfers.
Proposition 6 Assume actuarially fair insurance markets exist. Then:
(i) A TU policy effectively replicates the market solution with insurance purchases. It offers
full insurance against dependency but does nothing by way of providing insurance against the
default of altruism.
(ii) An OO policy may or may not do better than actuarially fair insurance markets for
dependency. The nature of the solution depends on the size of savings under an optimal OO
policy in the absence of private insurance markets, sOO.
a. If U ′
(
sOO
) ≥ 1 nobody purchases private insurance and we are back to the OO
solution without private insurance.
b. If U ′
(
sOO
)
< 1 parents buy private insurance. Then there are two possibilities.
One in which an OO policy is desirable; this will be the case if G has an interior solution as
characterized by (B3)). In the other, an interior solution for G does not exist and the OO
policy is not useful. In this case, the solution will be the same as the laissez faire solution with
insurance markets for dependency (and identical to a TU policy). In both cases, the parents
remain under-insured.
(iii) An opting-out-cum-transfer policy may or may not do better than actuarially fair insur-
ance markets for dependency. In particular,
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a. If U ′
(
sOC
) ≥ 1 nobody purchases any private insurance and we are back to the
opting-out-cum-transfer solution without private insurance.
b. If U ′
(
sOC
)
< 1 parents buy private insurance. Then g = 0 with two possibilities
identical to those under (ii)–b.
8 Incorporating children’s utility in the social welfare function
This section briefly examines if and how incorporating the children’s utility in the social welfare
function might affect our results. To simplify the exposition, we consider a utilitarian social
welfare function where parents and children have the same weight. Different weights would
affect the results in a straightforward way by either mitigating or reinforcing any new effects
that may show up.
That the children’s utility is equal to y with the probability 1−pi and y−a+βH (e) with the
probability of pi results in an expected utility of y−pia+piβH (e) for the children. However, fully
including the altruistic term of the expected utility, i.e. βH (e), in the social welfare function
raises some philosophical questions. With H (e), the parents’ utility from their consumption
when dependent, already appearing in the social welfare function, including βH (e) can be
considered as double counting. One may reasonably argue that this term should be excluded on
the grounds that it is already reflected in the social welfare function—a construct that right from
the start incorporates whatever is good for the society as a whole; see Hammond (1987) and
Diamond (2006). To defer to both schools of thought, we discount βH (e) by a factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
when including the children’s utility in the social welfare function. That is, we will augment our
previously stipulated social welfare function by the expression y−pia+piγβH (e). This runs the
gamut from the pure utilitarian approach (γ = 1) to when one completely “launders out” the
altruistic term (γ = 0).
8.1 Topping up
The government’s problem is now summarized by the Lagrangian:
£TU = wT − pig − sTU (g) + (1− pi)U (sTU (g))
+ pi
[
F (β˜
(
sTU (g) + g
)
)H
(
sTU (g) + g
)
+
∫ ∞
β˜(sTU (g)+g)
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
+ y − pi
∫ ∞
β˜
[
m(β)− sTU (g)− g] dF (β)
+ piγ
[
H
(
sTU (g) + g
) ∫ β˜
0
βdF (β) +
∫ ∞
β˜
βH(m(β))dF (β)
]
.
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Differentiating £TU with respect to g and simplifying, using the envelope theorem and the fact
that m(β˜) = sTU + g, yields
∂£TU
∂g
=
[
piF (β˜)H ′
(
sTU (g) + g
)− pi]
+ pi
[(
1− F (β˜)
)
+ γH ′
(
sTU (g) + g
) ∫ β˜
0
βdF (β)
](
1 +
∂sTU (g)
∂g
)
.
The first bracketed expression on the right-hand side of the above reflects the utility of the
parents and is identical to the terms in equation (21). The second bracketed expression represents
the additional terms associated with the children’s utility. It consists of two components both of
which are positive. This implies that extending the social welfare function to include children’s
utility, unambiguously increases the optimal LTC transfer g above its otherwise optimal value of
gTU . The first component of this expression relates to care-givers: increasing g above gTU allows
them to lower their own contribution by an equal amount (due to the full crowding-out at the
intensive margin effect of the public transfers). The second component relates to the children
who do not provide care to their parents: expanding g beyond gTU increases the parents’ utility
and with it the children’s utility as well. Observe that this effect vanishes if γ = 0 (i.e., if the
altruistic component of the child’s utility is laundered out). In sum, the case for public LTC is
strengthened when children’s utility is incorporated in the social welfare function.
8.2 Opting out
Incorporating the expected welfare of the children in (32), the social welfare function becomes
£OO ≡ wT − piF (β̂) [G− sOO(G)]− sOO(G) + (1− pi)U (sOO(G))
+ pi
[∫ ∞
β̂
H (m (β)) dF (β) + F (β̂)H (G)
]
+ y − pi
∫ ∞
β̂
[
m(β)− sOO (G)] dF (β)
+ piγ
[
H (G)
∫ β̂
0
βdF (β) +
∫ ∞
β̂
βH(m(β))dF (β)
]
.
Differentiating £OO with respect to G and simplifying, using the envelope theorem and the
definition of β̂, yields
d£OO
dG
=pi [A−B − C]
+ pi
(
1− F (β̂)
) ∂sOO (G)
∂G
+ piγH ′ (G)
∫ β̂
0
βdF (β)
+ pi(1− γ)β̂f(β̂)
[
H
(
β̂
)
−H (G)
] dβ̂
dG
,
where A, B, and C are defined in equation (33). The first bracketed expression on the right-
hand side of above is identical to the one (33). It reflects, as previously, the terms pertaining to
the parents. The other three expressions are associated with the children. The first relates to
the initial caregivers who will remain as caregivers. They prefer to see G decline from its GOO
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level. Such a reduction would lead to an increase in the parents’ savings which in turn lowers
the share of the private cost of care the children have to cover. The second component relates
to the children who do not help their parents the children. They want to see G increased. This
will increase their parents’ utility and with it their own utility as well. This effect vanishes if
the altruistic component of the utility is laundered out in full (γ = 0). The third component
relates to the initial marginal caregivers. They too want G to increase because this would allow
them to switch out of providing informal care (dβ̂/dG > 0). This effect remains as long as at
least part of the altruistic component of the children’s utility is laundered out (γ < 1). These
conflicting interests imply that including children’s utility in the social welfare function will have
an ambiguous effect on the optimal value of G.
8.3 Opting-out-cum-transfers
Incorporating the expected welfare of the children in the social welfare function changes the
government’s Lagrangian expression to:
£OC ≡ wT − piF (β)[G− sOC(G, g)]− pi[1− F (β)]g − sOC(G, g)+
+ (1− pi)U (sOC(G, g))+ pi[∫ ∞
β
H (m (β)) dF (β) + F (β)H (G)]
+ y − pi
∫ ∞
β
[
m(β)− sOC (G, g)− g] dF (β)
+ piγ
[
H (G)
∫ β
0
βdF (β) +
∫ ∞
β
βH(m(β))dF (β)
]
,
where β = β (G, g). Differentiating £OC partially with respect to G and g, and using the
envelope theorem, one obtains
∂£OC
∂G
= pi [A−B − C]
+ pi(1− F (β))∂s
OC (G, g)
∂G
+ piγH ′(G)
∫ β
0
βdF (β)
+ pi(1− γ)βf(β)[H(β)−H(G)]dβ
dG
∂£OC
∂g
= pi[B′ − C ′]
+ pi(1− F (β))(1 + ∂s
OC(G, g)
∂g
) + pi(1− γ)βf(β)[H(β)−H(G)]dβ
dg
,
where A, B, C B′ and C ′are defined in equations (42)–(43) and pertain to the parents’ utility.
The effect of a change in G on the children’s utility mirrors our discussion above for the OO
regime and is ambiguous. Similarly, and in contrast to our discussion above regarding the TU
policy, the effect of a change in g on the children’s utility is also ambiguous. First, caregivers
prefer a higher level of g for otherwise they would have to replace it with their own informal
care (due to the full crowding out at the intensive margin). Second, children who do not provide
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care would not care either way. With only the parents of caregivers receiving g, changing it will
have no effect on the children who do not provide care. Third, marginal children prefer a lower
level of g. A reduction in g increases β and allows them to switch out of providing informal care
(as long as the government launders out part of the altruistic component of their utility; i.e. if
γ < 1).40 In sum, including children’s utility in the social welfare increases g above gOC if there
is no “laundering out”; otherwise another effect in opposite direction surfaces due to the impact
on the marginal children.
9 Summary and conclusion
This paper has studied the role of private and public insurance programs in a world in which
family assistance is uncertain. It began by arguing that private insurance markets, even if they
exist and are actuarially fair, can offer insurance only against dependency and not against the
default of altruism. It then considered three public programs, topping up, opting out, and
opting-out-cum-transfers to find which, and under what circumstances, would do better than
private insurance. In doing so, the paper also studied the crowding out implication of each
policy both at the intensive and extensive margin.
The main takeaways of this study are: First, a TU policy offers full insurance against
dependency only; it does nothing by way of providing insurance against the default of altruism.
As such, it performs the same function as an actuarially fair private insurance market against
dependency does. Second, an OO policy in contrast may improve upon what private insurance
markets offer; sufficient conditions for which have been derived. Third, opting-out-cum-transfer
policies are even more likely to do better than private insurance markets. Distortions arising
from opting-out and transfer components can, to some degree, offset one another. Fourth, none
of these policies can achieve full insurance against altruism default.
The paper has also found that the three public LTC policies have different crowding-out
implications for the informal care that children provide. Whereas a TU policy entails crowding
out at both intensive and extensive margins, an OO policy leads only to crowding out at the
extensive margin. In the case of an opting-out-cum-transfer policy, its opting-out component
leads to crowding out at the extensive margin. In contrast, its transfer component leads to
crowding out at the intensive margin while it also entails crowding in at the extensive margin
as it induces more children to assist their parents.
These results were derived for a social welfare function that depends solely on the parents’
utilities. They were re-examined in Section 8 by incorporating the utility of the grown-up
children in the social welfare function. In this reformulation, crowding out is no longer only a
cost to the society but it may also serve as a source of benefit (by reducing caregivers’ costs).
Interestingly, the desired level of public assistance under TU will become higher because the
children’s expected utility increases with public provision. However, the expansion of public
LTC programs may not be warranted for the other two policies. The OO will and the OC
might reduce the parents’ private savings thus shifting a larger share of the burden to informal
40When γ = 1 this term vanishes because of the envelope theorem.
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caregivers. The various tradeoffs have been described in Section 8.
There are other more specific results that have been reported in Propositions 1–6. Some of
these are based on the simplifying assumptions we have made. For instance, the equivalence
between TU and (fair) private insurance markets is due to the assumption that individuals are
ex-ante identical. However, this should not distract from the fundamental message of the paper;
namely, that uncertain altruism and the infeasibility of offering private insurance against its
default create a role for LTC public insurance. If properly designed, it can provide the parents
with insurance against the risk of not being able to count on adequate informal care if they
become dependent. In fact, if anything, ex-ante heterogeneity of parents will only strength the
case for public insurance. Private insurance cannot redistribute resources among parents whose
children are likely to be more or less altruistic; only social insurance can. Similarly, poor parents
may be unable to afford LTC insurance even if it were available at fair rates. Assuming parents
to be ex-ante identical divests social insurance from its redistributive advantages and allows one
to compare it with private insurance solely in terms of their efficiency properties.
Another simplifying assumption is the quasi-linearity of children’s utility in income while
expressing informal care in monetary terms (and thus a perfect substitute to income). This
lies behind the full crowding out at the intensive margin result under a TU policy regime. As
alternatives, one can postulate a concave utility of income net of the monetary cost of care,
quasi-linearity but a convex cost of care, or quasi-linearity with a concave benefit of care to the
parents.41 These specifications too will lead to crowding out; thought no longer in full. To be
more precise, under suitable concavity/convexity assumptions, crowding out under TU persists
albeit not on a one-to-one basis. Similarly, there will be less crowding out of the parents’
savings but it will not disappear. Again, these alternative formulations only strengthen the
case for public insurance (while complicating the analysis significantly). From a social welfare
perspective, crowding out represents a cost; consequently, the less of it there is the stronger will
be the justification for having a public LTC.
We conclude by observing that, while the tradeoffs we have highlighted should inform policy
makers in their quest for finding the “right” public LTC scheme, a lot more needs to be done.
A number of our simplifying assumptions should be relaxed in future research (but not all at
the same time). First, our analysis is based on a particular type of altruism. It is one-sided
and ascending; namely, it reflects only the concerns of children towards their parents and not
vice-versa. It is also restricted, meaning that it is triggered by the state of dependency of the
parents (it disappears if parents remain healthy). Implications of dropping one or both of these
assumptions are worth exploring. Related to this, is the issue of strategic bequests which, with
one-sided altruism, we have ignored.
Second, there is the assumption that parents are unable to influence their children’s degree
of altruism or its distribution. Introducing such a possibility will be an interesting extension.
However, it is too complex to be added to the current paper (but it is on our research agenda).
For one, it is not a given that investing time and/or money in the education of children increases
the likelihood of receiving informal care from them. Quite the opposite; the relationship between
41By writing children’s utility as Uc(c−a)+βH(s+g+a), y−φ(a)+βH(s+g+a) or y−a+βH(s+g+ϕ(a)).
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the two is likely to be rather complex and possibly inverse U-shaped. Children who feel neglected
may not be very inclined to help their dependent parents; but highly-educated children are likely
to move away to pursue their career so that they may not be in a position to provide informal
care.
Third, a lot more needs to be done with respect to the financing of LTC. We have simply
assumed that the financing comes from a proportional income tax levied on the parents. We
have additionally assumed that the government is able to tax away the dependent parents’
resources (savings and any private insurance they may have purchased). These are rather strong
assumptions. It is not clear that the labor supply or private assets are observable at no cost. In
future research, it would be important to introduce a richer fiscal tool-box including non-linear
taxes.
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Appendix A
Proof of sFI < sLF < sFI + δ: Substitute sFI (δ) for sFI in equation (10), differentiate it
totally with respect to δ, and simplify to get
(1− pi)U ′′ (sFI) dsFI
dδ
+pi
(
dsFI
dδ
+ 1
)[
−f (β0)
H ′′
(
sFI + δ
)
H ′ (sFI + δ)
+ F
(
β0
(
sFI + δ
))
H ′′
(
sFI + δ
)]
= 0.
Then collect the terms and “solve” for dsFI/dδ. This results in
dsFI
dδ
= − piH
′′ (sFI + δ) [F (β0)− f (β0)β0]
(1− pi)U ′′ (sFI) + piH ′′ (sFI + δ) [F (β0)− f (β0)β0] < 0, (A1)
where the sign of (A1) follows from the concavity of H(·), U(·) and F (β). Now observe that
setting δ = 0 in (10) simplifies it to equation (8) in the laissez faire so that sFI (0) = sLF . This
allows us to deduce, for δ > 0,
sFI < sLF .
Next, sFI < sLF implies that U ′
(
sFI
)
> U ′
(
sLF
)
. Comparing (10) with (8) then tells us
that
F
(
β0
(
sFI + δ
))
H ′
(
sFI + δ
)
< F (β0(s
LF ))H ′
(
sLF
)
. (A2)
But,
d
ds
F (β0(s))H
′ (s) = f (β0)
dβ0(s)
ds
H ′ (s) + F (β0(s))H ′′ (s)
= [F (β0(s))− β0(s)f (β0)]H ′′ (s) < 0.
so that F (β0(s))H
′ (s) is a decreasing function of s. It then follows from (A2) that
sFI + δ > sLF .
Proof of Proposition 4: We first prove that β˜ = β˜
(
sTU + gTU
)
< β̂
(
gTU + sTU , sTU
) ≡ βA.
Start from the optimal policy under TU and examine under what conditions it can be replicated
under OO. Consider the optimal policy under TU, gTU , which yields sTU and an expected utility
for the parent given by
EUTU ≡ wT −pigTU − sTU + (1− pi)U (sTU)+pi [∫ ∞
β˜
H (m (β)) dF (β) + F (β˜)H
(
sTU + gTU
)]
, (A3)
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Replace this policy by an OO policy in which in which G is set equal to gTU + sTU and s is set
equal to sTU . The expected utility of parents under this alternative policy is, from (32),
EUOO
(
gTU + sTU , sTU
)
= wT − sTU + (1− pi)U (sTU)+
piF (βA)
[
H
(
gTU + sTU
)− gTU]+ pi ∫ ∞
βA
H (m (β)) dF (β). (A4)
Subtracting (A3) from (A4) and simplifying
EUOO
(
gTU + sTU , sTU
)− EUTU = pi [∫ ∞
βA
H (m (β)) dF (β)−
∫ ∞
βA
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
+
pigTU
[
1− F (βA)]+ piH (gTU + sTU) [F (βA)− F (β˜)] . (A5)
Next compare β˜ with βA to determine if a child with β = β˜ provides assistance under this
alternative OO policy. Recall from (25) that, under OO and for a given G and s, the threshold
level of β below which no assistance is provided is implicitly defined by β̂
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
]
−(
m(β̂)− s
)
= 0. Hence atG = gTU+sTU and s = sTU , this threshold level, βA ≡ β̂ (gTU + sTU , sTU),
is given by
β̂
[
H(m(βA))−H (gTU + sTU)]− (m(βA)− sTU) = 0.
But, from the definition of β˜, we have that m(β˜) = gTU + sTU . Hence at β = β˜, the left-hand
side of the above expression is
β˜
[
H(m(β˜))−H (gTU + sTU)]− (m(β˜)− sTU) = −gTU < 0,
implying that
β˜ < βA.
Hence a child with β = β˜ will not provide aid under this alternative OO policy.
With β˜ < βA, we rewrite equation (A5) as
EUOO
(
gTU + sTU , sTU
)− EUTU =
pi
{[
1− F (βA)] gTU − ∫ βA
β˜
[
H (m (β))−H (gTU + sTU)] dF (β)} , (A6)
which is non-negative if the right-hand side of (A6) is non-negative. Now since the optimal OO
values of G and s are generally different from gTU + sTU and sTU , it must be the case that
EUOO ≥ EUOO (gTU + sTU , sTU) ≥ EUTU ,
if the right-hand side of (A6) is non-negative.
Proof of (40) and (41): To prove (40), differentiate (38)–(39) partially with respect to G
and g, and “solve” using Cramer’s rule:
∂sOC
∂G
|g = −pif
′(β)βH ′(G)
(1− pi)U ′′(sOC)∆H − pif ′(β) < 0, (A7)
∂sOC
∂g
|G = pif
′(β)
(1− pi)U ′′(sOC)∆H − pif ′(β) > 0, (A8)
∂β
∂G
|g = (1− pi)U
′′(sOC)βH ′(G)
(1− pi)U ′′(sOC)∆H − pif ′(β) > 0, (A9)
∂β
∂g
|G = −(1− pi)U
′′(sOC)
(1− pi)U ′′(sOC)∆H − pif ′(β) < 0, (A10)
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where ∆H = H(m(β)) − H (G). The signs follow from the negativity of the denominator in
each of the equations (second-order condition of the parents’ optimization problem with respect
to s), and the concavity of F (·) which implies f ′ (·) = F ′′ (·) < 0. To prove (41), divide (A7) by
(A8) and (A9) by (A10).
Proof of (44): Rearrange equations (42)–(43) and divide the former by the latter to get
1
pi
∂£OC
∂G − F (β)H ′ (G) + f(β) ∂β∂G∆H +
[
F (β)− F (β)∂sOC∂G
]
1
pi
∂£OC
∂g + f(β)
∂β
∂g∆H +
[
1− F (β)− F (β)∂sOC∂g
] = ∂β∂G
∂β
∂g
= −βH ′ (G) ,
where we have used (41). ex Multiplying through
1
pi
∂£OC
∂G
− F (β)H ′ (G) + f(β) ∂β
∂G
∆H +
[
F (β)− F (β)∂s
OC
∂G
]
=
− βH ′ (G)
{
1
pi
∂£OC
∂g
+ f(β)
∂β
∂g
∆H +
[
1− F (β)− F (β)∂s
OC
∂g
]}
.
Or
1
pi
∂£OC
∂G
− F (β)H ′ (G) + f(β) ∂β
∂G
∆H +
[
F (β)− F (β)∂s
OC
∂G
]
+{
1
pi
∂£OC
∂g
+ f(β)
∂β
∂g
∆H +
[
1− F (β)− F (β)∂s
OC
∂g
]}
βH ′ (G) = 0.
or,
1
pi
∂£OC
∂G
+
1
pi
βH ′ (G)
∂£OC
∂g
= −f(β)∆H
[
∂β
∂G
+
∂β
∂g
βH ′ (G)
]
+ F (β)
[
∂sOC
∂G
+ βH ′ (G)
∂sOC
∂g
]
+ F (β)
[
H ′ (G)− 1]− [1− F (β)]βH ′ (G) .
But we have, from (41),
∂β
∂G
+ βH ′ (G)
∂β
∂g
=
∂sOC
∂G
+ βH ′ (G)
∂sOC
∂g
= 0.
Substituting in the expressions above results in
1
pi
∂£OC
∂G
+
1
pi
βH ′ (G)
∂£OC
∂g
= F (β)
[
H ′ (G)− 1]+ [1− F (β)] [−βH ′ (G)] .
Evaluating this expression at the optimal solution to the OO scheme (assuming it has an interior
solution) and g = 0, we arrive at equation (44).
Appendix B
Let δ denote the amount of private insurance against dependency purchased and piδ its
actuarially fair premium.
B1 Topping up
We have previously examined the implications of actuarially fair insurance markets for the laissez
faire solution in Subsection 2.2. Comparing the market outcome there with the TU solution
engineered by the government in Section 3, one immediately observes that the two solutions are
identical. The implication of this result is that a TU policy offers only full insurance against
dependency and does nothing by way of providing insurance against the default of altruism.
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B2 Opting out
Start with a pure OO policy and examine the changes that private insurance may lead to in
each stage of our model. As far as the children are concerned, equation (25) changes to
β̂
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
]
−
(
m(β̂)− s− δ
)
= 0,
where β̂(G, s+ δ) has replaced β̂(G, s). Yet partial differentiation of β̂(G, s+ δ) with respect to
G and s yields equations for ∂β̂/∂G and ∂β̂/∂s identical to (26)–(27). Partial differentiation of
β̂(G, s+ δ) with respect to δ results in ∂β̂/∂δ = ∂β̂/∂s.
The parents’ expected utility now includes a term for the cost of purchasing insurance:
EU = w (1− τ)T − s− piδ + (1− pi)U (s) + pi
[
H (G)F (β̂) +
∫ ∞
β̂
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
,
which they maximize with respect to s and δ. The first-order condition with respect to s,
assuming an interior solution as previously, yields an equation identical to (28), and then, upon
substituting for ∂β̂/∂s, an equation identical to (29), except for s + δ replacing s in β̂. To
determine δ, consider the partial derivative of EU with respect to δ,
∂EU
∂δ
= −pi − pif(β̂)
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] ∂β̂
∂δ
.
Substitute for ∂β̂/∂δ, from the expression for ∂β̂/∂s in (27), evaluate at δ = 0, and use (29).
This yields
∂EU
∂δ
|δ=0 = −pi + pif(β̂) = (1− pi)
[
1− U ′ (sOO)] .
Two possibilities arise:
Case (i): U ′
(
sOO
) ≥ 1 so that δ = 0 and nobody purchases any private insurance for
dependency even if offered at an actuarially fair premium. This lead us back to the pure OO
solution.
Case (ii): U ′
(
sOO
)
< 1. Under this circumstance δ > 0 so that at the optimum U ′ (s) = 1.
Consequently, the solution for savings is the same we had under laissez faire with insurance
markets: s = sFI . Substituting this value in the first-order condition for s (which continues to
be represented by (29)), we have42
f(β̂(G, sFI + δ)) = 1. (B1)
This condition implies that β̂ only depends on the shape of the distribution function F (β),
and not on the public policy. Solving for δ then results in δ (G). Substituting δ (G) in (B1),
differentiating the resulting identity with respect to G, and simplifying results in
dδ
dG
= −
∂β̂
∂G
∂β̂
∂δ
= −
β̂H′(G)
H(m(β̂))−H(G)
− 1
H(m(β̂))−H(G)
= β̂H ′ (G) . (B2)
We can now study the government’s optimal choice of G. The government maximizes the
parents’ optimized value of EU subject to its budget constraint,
τwT = piF (β̂)
[
G− sFI − δ] .
This leads to the maximization of the following welfare function,
£ = EU (G)− piF (β̂) [G− sFI − δ (G)] ,
42There can only exist a unique β that satisfies condition (B1). This follows from the concavity of F (·).
Obviously, if there does not exist any β that satisfies (B1), only Case (i) can arise.
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where β̂ ≡ β̂(G, sFI + δ (G)). Maximizing £ with respect to G, using the envelope theorem, we
have
d£
dG
= piH ′ (G)F (β̂)− pif(β̂)
[
H(m(β̂))−H (G)
] ∂β̂
∂G
|s,δ−
pi
[
F (β̂)
(
1− dδ
dG
)
+ (G− sFI − δ (G))f(β̂)dβ̂
dG
]
.
Observe that the three terms on the right-hand side correspond to terms A,B, and C in the
pure opting out solution (equation (33)). The first two terms have identical formulations. In
term C, dδ/dG has replaced dsOO/dG and (G− sFI − δ (G)) has replaced (G− sOO). Moreover,
we have β̂ = β̂(G, sFI + δ (G)) rather than β̂ = β̂(G, sOO (G)).
Next substitute for ∂β̂/∂G, dδ/dG, and dβ̂/dG in the expression for d£/dG to get
d£
dG
= pi
{[
F (β̂)− f(β̂)β̂ + F (β̂)β̂
]
H ′ (G)− F (β̂)
}
,
where F (β̂) − f(β̂)β̂ > 0 due to the concavity of F (·). Two possibilities arise depending on
the sign of d£/dG at G = sFI + δ (G). If d£/dG ≤ 0, there is no interior solution for G and
an OO policy is not helpful. Under this circumstance, we have the laissez faire solution with
insurance markets for dependency (as in Subsection 2.2) which is equivalent to the TU solution.
Otherwise, if d£/dG > 0, there is an interior solution for G given by
H ′ (G) =
F (β̂)
F (β̂) +
(
1− F (β̂)
)(
−β̂
) > 1, (B3)
where, from (B1), f(β̂) has been set equal to one. An OO policy is desirable but it still does
not offer full insurance.
B3 Opting-out-cum-transfers
The presence of private insurance markets lead to :the following changes. As far as the children
are concerned, their threshold level of β, β(G, s+ δ + g), changes to
β
[
H(m(β))−H (G)]− (m(β)− s− δ − g) = 0, (B4)
Partial differentiation of β(G, s+ δ+ g) with respect to G, s, and g yields identical equations to
(36)–(37) for ∂β/∂G and ∂β/∂g = ∂β/∂s; partial differentiation of β(G, s+ δ+ g) with respect
to δ results in ∂β/∂δ = ∂β/∂g = ∂β/∂s.
Turning to the parents’ expected utility, it is now given by
EU = w (1− τ)T − s− piδ + (1− pi)U (s) + pi
[
H (G)F (β) +
∫ ∞
β
H (m (β)) dF (β)
]
,
which they maximize with respect to s and δ. The first-order condition with respect to s,
assuming an interior solution as previously, yields an equation identical to (38), and then upon
substituting for ∂β/∂s an equation identical to (39), except for s + δ replacing s in β. To
determine δ, consider the partial derivative of EU with respect to δ,
∂EU
∂δ
= −pi − pif(β) [H(m(β))−H (G)] ∂β
∂δ
.
Substitute for ∂β/∂δ, from the expression for ∂β/∂s in (37), evaluate at δ = 0, and use (39) to
get
∂EU
∂δ
|δ=0 = −pi + pif(β) = (1− pi)
[
1− U ′ (sOC)] .
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Two possibilities arise:
Case (i): U ′
(
sOC
) ≥ 1 so that δ = 0 and nobody purchases any private insurance even
if offered at an actuarially fair premium. This leads us back to the opting-out-cum-transfer
solution.
Case (ii): U ′
(
sOC
)
< 1. Under this circumstance δ > 0 so that at the optimum U ′ (s) = 1.
Again, the solution for savings will be the same as we had under laissez faire with insurance mar-
kets: s = sFI . Substituting in the first-order condition for s, which continues to be represented
by (39), we have
f(β(G, sFI + δ + g)) = 1. (B5)
The system of equations (B4)–(B5) jointly determines the values of δ and β = β(G, sFI + δ+ g)
as functions of G and g: δOC(G, g) and β (G, g) ≡ β(G, sFI + δOC(G, g) + g). Differentiating
this system of equations with respect to G and g, we have
∂β
∂G
|g = 0, ∂δ
∂G
|g = βH ′ (G) ; and ∂β
∂g
|G = 0, ∂δ
∂g
|G = −1.
Next is the determination of the government’s optimal choice of G. The government maxi-
mizing the parents’ optimized value of EU subject to its budget constraint
τwT = pi
{
F (β)
[
G− sFI − δ]+ (1− F (β)) g} .
This leads to the maximization of the following welfare function
£ = EU (G, g)− pi {F (β) [G− sFI − δ]+ (1− F (β)) g} ,
where β = β (G, g). Differentiating £ partially with respect to G and g, and using the envelope
theorem, one obtains
∂£
∂G
= piH ′ (G)F (β)− pif(β) [H(m(β))−H (G)] ∂β
∂G
|s,δ,g−
pi
[(
G− sFI − δ) f(β)∂β
∂G
+ F (β)
(
1− ∂δ
∂G
)
− gf(β)∂β
∂G
]
,
= pi
{
H ′ (G)F (β)− f(β)βH ′ (G)− F (β) [1− βH ′ (G)]} ,
∂£
∂g
= −pif(β) [H(m(β))−H (G)] ∂β
∂g
|s,δ,G−
pi
[(
G− sFI − δ) f(β)∂β
∂g
− F (β)∂δ
∂g
− gf(β)∂β
∂g
+
(
1− F (β))]
= pi
[
f(β)− 1] = 0.
Observe again that the three terms on the right-hand side of ∂£/∂G correspond to terms
A,B, and C in the opting-out-cum-transfer solution (equation (42)), with a slightly different
formulation for term C. The terms continue to have the same interpretations. There continue
to be two possibilities depending on the sign of ∂£/∂G at G = sFI + δ (G) + g. If ∂£/∂G ≤ 0,
there is no interior solution for G and an opting out policy is not desirable (not even a pure
one). The solution will then be the same as the laissez faire solution with insurance markets.
If ∂£/∂G > 0, there is an interior solution for G characterized by (B3). Either way parents are
under-insured.
Similarly, the two terms on the right-hand side ∂£/∂g correspond to terms B′, and C ′ in
the opting-out-cum-transfer solution (equation (43)), with a slightly different formulation for
C ′. As before, and for the same reason, there is no term corresponding to A. They continue to
have the same interpretations.
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